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Pateicoties šadai “sakrustošanai”, algoritms CORA 4.5 atšķirība no parasta algoritma
CORA
1) spēs darboties ar daudzām atribūtu vērtībām, ne tikai binārām;
2) spēs darboties ar nepārtrauktām atribūtu vērtībām;
3) darbosies ar nezināmām atribūtu vērtībām;
4) izmantos ieguvuma kritēriju (gain ratio criterion) vērtīgāko pazīmju atrašanai.
Atšķirībā no algoritma C4.5 algoritms CORA 4.5, veidojot jēdzienu vispārinājumus, 
izmantos nevis atsevišķu atribūtu vērtības, bet atribūtu kompleksus jeb pazīmes, kas dziļāk 
atspoguļo vispārināmās koncepcijas jēgu, tādējādi radot cilvēkam-ekspertam labāk 
saprotamus secināšanas likumus.
4. Nobeigums
Turpmākajos pētījumos ir paredzēts augstāk minētās teorētiskās idejas realizēt praksē, 
izveidojot funkcionējošu CORA 4.5 datorprogrammu. Tas dos iespēju empīriski salīdzināt 
algoritmu CORA 4.5 ar tā priekštečiem -  CORA un C4.5, kā arī ar citiem jēdzienu 
vispārināšanas algoritmiem.
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1. Introduction
Making decisions in any kind o f human activity is associated with the evaluation o f  the 
outcomes o f  alternative courses o f  actions and subjective preferences o f  the decision maker. 
Subjective judgements made by human beings can represent actual realities o f  the external 
world with different degree o f  adequacy. Subjective misrepresentation o f  the real state of 
things can be due to partialities o f  various kind. Some kinds o f partialities axe briefly examined 
in [Uzga-Rebrovs, 2000]. The present paper presents a detailed analysis o f  the reasons for 
possible violation o f the logic o f  reasoning in decision making. The paper begins with a brief 
characteristic o f the main classes o f the decision making theory. Further sections analyze 
possible situations in which preference misrepresentation might take place. Based on the 
analysis, a conclusion is made that the considered reasons for preference misrepresentation 
cannot make a basis to revise fundamental decision making theories. The existing difficulties
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can be overcome successfully through a more strict analysis o f the initial situations o f decision 
making and the development o f  additional decision analysis methods so as to take into account 
the uncertainties o f  probabilistic evaluations.
2. Analysis of basic decision making theories
Every decision making theory is aimed to develop the rules to choose a decision, 
optimal in a given sense, from the initial set o f alternative decisions. The concept o f optimality 
is related to the preference system o f the decision maker in the set o f  outcomes of alternative 
decisions.
The whole set o f decision making theories can be divided to three large classes: 
descriptive, nonnative and prescriptive theories.
A  descriptive theory tries to describe the world as it is. Its quality is determined by the 
space over which it accurately characterizes and predicts the behavior o f  real-world systems. 
All the theories describing the physical behavior o f  natural systems are descriptive. The role o f 
descriptive theories in decision making processes is, however, rather limited. Since decision 
making is a conscious act, the role o f descriptive theories is reduced to the description and 
analysis o f  common empirical regularities o f  human being behavior in choice situations.
The main role o f normative theories is to establish such rules that would „lead To a 
logically validated and consistent choice o f decisions. Normative theories are axiomatic. Based 
on the system o f  axioms established, theorems and choice rules are produced. The most 
widespread is the expected utility theory based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms 
system [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953).
Special role in decision making is played by prescriptive theories. These theories try to 
explain how people make decisions on the basis o f  the normative theory accepted. In general 
case, conclusions o f  prescriptive theories have rather inconsistent nature. On the one hand, 
they aim to approach strict normative theories. On the other hand, a tendency can be seen to 
lessen the demands o f normative theories when applying them to solve specific problems. 
Should be regarded as successful the definition o f  Keeney [Keeney, 1996] stating that 
descriptive theories are different approximation extents o f  normative theories.
The system o f axioms underlying any normative theory is based on the common and 
consistent logic o f  human reasoning. However, due to factors either not considered or 
misinterpreted, the logic o f reasoning might be violated. This yields very unpleasant 
consequences in choosing decisions. In what follows, the factors disturbing the normal choice 
of decisions are analyzed.
3. Non-taking into account all the initial information
To demonstrate possible violation o f the logic o f  reasoning in decision making, various 
specific choice tasks were developed. This section examines one problem of this kind, the 
Allais problem. Various versions o f  this problem exist. Here a version suggested in [Howard, 
1996] is considered. Suppose an individual has the chance to win a large sum o f money under 
the following conditions. According to the toss o f  a coin he will receive an opportunity to act 
either in situation A, or in situation B. If the individual gets in situation A, he will choose 
between two deals, deal D1 and deal D2. Deal D1 is associated with receiving a sure 1,000,000 
conditional monetary unit (c.m.u.). With deal D2 the individual will have a 10% chance of 
winning 5,000,000 c.m.u., an 89% chance o f  winning 1,000,000 c.m.u., and a 1 percent chance 
o f winning nothing. If the individual is in situation B, he will have to choose between deal D3 
and deal D4. Deal D3 has a 10 percent chance o f  winning 5,000,000 c.m.u., and a 90 percent
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chance o f  winning nothing. Deal D4 has an 11 percent chance o f  receiving 1,000,000 c.m.u. 
and a 89 percent chance o f  winning nothing. Figure 1 shows decision trees for the possibilities 
arising in both choice situations.
Which action courses will the individual choose in both choice situations? It was found 
empirically that most o f  individuals prefer deal D1 in situation A and deal D3 in situation B. 
Such choices can be regarded as validated from the point o f view  o f risk averse individuals. 
However, from the viewpoint o f  the expected utility theory (or in a simplified form, on the
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Figure 1. Decision trees representing choice situations in the Allais problem
basis o f the expected win maximization) both choices are erroneous. This is because the 
individuals choose deals given that the choice situation is known. The fact that choosing each 
situation is a random event is not taken into account. According to any normative decision 
making theory, the evaluation and choice o f actions must be performed on the basis o f  the 
complete prior information. A real initial choice situation is presented in Fig.2.
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Figure 2. Initial choice situation in the Allais problem
Let us compare in pairs course actions related to different choice situations (see Fig. 3). 
A simple analysis shows that a pair o f  deals, D1 and D3, preferred by most individuals gives 
the same results as a pair o f deals, D2 and D4. Common sense let the individuals down 
because they did not take into account all the initial information.
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Figure 3. Possible choice strategies in the Allais problem
4. The Ellsberg problem
This famous problem requires people to express preferences for the case when the 
chances o f events are uncertain. An urn B contains 90 balls o f which 30 are red and 60 are 
either blue or yellow. The proportion o f balls o f each color is unknown. An individual is 
presented the following choice situation. According to the toss o f a coin, one o f two choice 
situations, A or B, is determined. After that a ball is drawn from the urn. The payoff schemes 
are shown in Fig.4.
Which scheme will the individual prefer in each situation? It was found experimentally 
that most people prefer to play with payoff schemes A1 and B l. This happens because the 
proportion o f  blue and yellow balls in the urn is uncertain.
A strict analysis o f  the conditions o f the task provides very interesting results. 
Regarding the composition o f  blue and yellow' balls in the urn, different suggestions can be 
made. For example, it can be assumed that all the balls are blue or all the balls are yellow. It 
can also be assumed that the number o f yellow and blue balls is equal. In the general case it 
can be shown that any reasonable suggestion about the distribution o f blue balls produces the 
mean number o f those balls equal to 30. From this it follows that the probability o f a blue ball 
must be equal to 1/3. Then the probability o f  a yellow ball is also 1/3.
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Figure 4. The payoff schemes in the Ellsberg problem
In many real-world decision making tasks it is frequently conditionally assumed that 
all these probabilities are equal provided that the probabilities o f  uncertain events are 
unknown. This assumption is neither worse and nor better than any other assumption in the 
case o f complete lack o f information.
For the task in question, the probabilities o f  balls o f  each color turn out to be equal. 
Hence, the individual must be indifferent between A1 and A2 or B1 and B2. A  shift in 
preferences occurred due to the intuitive aversion o f  the uncertainty about the chances o f the 
events.
5. The problem of the unbiased decision choice
To understand the essence o f  this problem, let us consider an illustrative example. 
Suppose a lady has a unique jewelry collection inherited from her grandmother. She has 
decided to present it to one o f her nieces who are twin sisters. The problem is to decide to 
whom the present should be given, since they both are equally attractive to her. In the long run, 
the aunt has made the Solomon decision. She decided to flip a coin to determine a candidate 
for the present. Was she right committing her choice to the blind fate? From the point o f view  
o f impartiality her reasoning logic is irreproachable. However, this is not the case from the 
viewpoint o f the nieces. If the mechanism o f choice is unknown to the sisters, one o f them will 
feel unfairly offended.
This random mechanism of choice is frequently employed in real-life situations. For 
example, a candidate for a vacant position can be chosen with the help o f  this mechanism. The 
candidates, however, might oppose it seriously. Let us consider an row example. A  burglar 
determines which o f  two banks to rob according to the toss o f a coin. He may consider his 
choice correct. However, his choice will fairly be regarded as true from the point o f view of 
the bank robbed.
Summing up all the aspects o f this kind o f choice, the following conclusion has to be 
made. The random mechanism of choice not based on the decision maker’s preferences cannot 
be regarded as successful. If the ourcome o f the choice somehow touches the interests o f 
individuals, certain ethic and other problems can arise. The decision maker may be given
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recommendations to incorporate additional evaluation criteria on the basis o f which a 
unambiguous and validated choice can be made.
6. Conclusions
Normative decision choice theories, in particular, the expected utility theory, or 
expected outcome evaluation theory, have proved their validity in numerous case studies. 
These theories are based on simple and logically validated axioms. The reasoning logic of 
rationally thinking people in most cases is subject to the demands o f  those theories.
Certain violations o f  reasoning logic can be due to different reasons. Some of the 
reasons are examined in this paper. The Allais problem illustrates visually where ignoring a 
part o f the initial information could lead. In the Ellsberg problem the preferences of the 
individual are heavily influenced by the uncertainty regarding the chances o f random events. 
Finally, it should be noted that a special class is made o f choice tasks in which the decision 
maker is indifferent with regard to alternatives.
Attempts to develop alternative normative decision choice theories have been made so 
as to overcome the above difficulties. These theories, however, suffer from conceptual 
shortcomings [Sarin, 1996]. The difficulties outlined can be overcome by sufficiently simpler 
techniques. Say in order to avoid the choice situation similar to that considered in the Allais 
problem, one has to properly account for all the factors o f the problem. This is quite a simple 
task for the experienced analyst.
As regards the uncertainty o f the probabilistic evaluations, it cannot be avoided in 
principle provided the necessary information is missing or is incomplete. It can, however, be 
concerned correctly with the help o f the suitable choice function. Two prescriptive approaches 
of this kind are examined in [Sarin, 1996].
If the decision maker is indifferent in choosing the alternatives, the problem is not in 
the decision making theory but in the decision maker himself. The preferences of the 
individual can always be shifted towards the unambiguous choice by incorporating additional 
evaluation factors.
From this it follows that the considered problems cannot be a reason to revise the 
existing normative decision making theories. It is quite enough with the validated corrections 
o f the theories that are o f  prescriptive nature.
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